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¯A”	is	a	correct	paraphrase	only	when	the	modal	operators	are	taken	to	denote	physical	(i.e.	causal)	necessity	and	possibility,	as	well.	It	may	be	possible	to	construct	a	logic	of	ability	to	capture	a	more	nuanced	view	of	the	“can”	in	ought-implies-can,	but	I	will	not	give	one	here.	I	will	take	the	above	as	the	correct	paraphrase,	using	a	generalized	version	in	the	argument	below.	It	will	do	well	to	take	note,	however,	that	all	appearances	of	modal	operators	will	have	to	correspond	to	the	physical	interpretation.	The	argument	dismissing	dilemmas	is	by	reductio	ad	absurdum.	Formally,	it	goes	as	follows:		(1) OA	 	 	 	 (Premise)	(2) OB	 	 	 	 (Premise)	(3)	 ~¯(A	&	B)	 	 	 (Premise)	
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dilemmas,	but	I	will	say	for	now	that	the	principle	comes	up	against	significant	difficulties	when	one	is	more	careful	with	the	modal	operator.	The	second	argument	claiming	dilemmas’	inconsistency	goes	thus,	assuming	S5	(whereby	all	possible	worlds	are	freely	accessible)	as	the	modal	system:	(3) OA	 	 	 	 (Premise)	(4) OB	 	 	 	 (Premise)	(3)	 ~¯(A	&	B)	 	 	 (Premise)	(4)	 £~(A	&	B)	 	 	 (From	3	by	interdefinition	of	¯	&	£)	(5)	 £(A	⊃	~B)	 	 	 (From	4	by	truth-functional	replacement)	(6)	 £(A	⊃	~B)	⊃	(OA	⊃	O~B)	 (PDE)	(7)	 O~B	 	 	 	 (From	1,	5,	and	6)	(8)	~(OB	&	O~B)	 	 	 (PDC)	(9)	OB	&	O~B		 	 	 (From	2	and	7)	Again,	the	premises	of	the	argument	simply	describe	a	moral	dilemma.	The	truth-functional	replacement	in	(5)	will	require	multiple	steps	in	most	rigorous	proof	systems,	but	any	plausible	modal	system	will	preserve	necessity	across	truth-functionally	equivalent	statements.	The	use	of	“¯”	to	indicate	causal	possibility	in	(3)	is	important.	As	I	mentioned	when	discussing	ability	in	the	previous	chapter,	this	interpretation	of	the	modal	operators	is	useful	for	capturing	notions	like	an	agent’s	ability,	and	for	discussing	what	lies	in	the	realm	of	physical	possibility.	The	problem	arises	in	(6),	when	the	argument	makes	use	of	the	same	modal	system	to	express	the	principle	of	deontic	entailment.	This	use	assumes	(PDE)	is	meant	to	apply	to	instances	of	causal	necessity,	wherein	one’s	taking	A	determines,	due	to	facts	about	
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the	world,	that	one	takes	action	B.	The	other	possible	interpretation	of	(PDE)	is	that	it	applies	to	cases	of	logical	entailment.	The	contradiction	between	(8)	and	(9)	is	clear,	and	all	the	inferences	are	straightforward.	It	seems	again	that	the	best	criticisms	of	this	argument	will	target	the	axioms.	Above,	I	offered	brief	explanations	of	the	axioms,	and	I	defended	(PDC)	somewhat.	The	fact	that	the	principle	of	deontic	consistency	follows	straightforwardly	from	more	fundamental	principles	at	least	provides	a	strong	reason	to	accept	it.	I	will	focus	my	remarks	here	on	(PDE).	The	principle	of	deontic	entailment	is	certainly	a	valuable	addition	to	any	system	of	formalizing	ethics.	Whenever	one	obligation	gives	rise	to	a	related	one,	chances	are	good	that	it	does	so	because	of	entailment.	In	my	earlier	example,	I	discussed	promises.	The	obligation	to	keep	a	promise	obviously	entails	a	subsequent	obligation	to	take	whatever	course	of	action	was	promised.	An	intuitive	explanation	for	that	relationship	would	be	that	whenever	one	action	entails	another,	the	second	is	obligatory	if	the	first	is.	In	this	case,	keeping	the	promise	to	visit	my	friend	entails	visiting	my	friend.	(PDE)	offers	a	reason	for	the	one	duty	to	give	rise	to	the	other.	I	will	turn	shortly	to	a	potential	causal	account	of	(PDE).	The	distinction	between	logical	and	causal	necessity	and	possibility	may	need	some	further	illumination	first,	though.	Both	of	these	concepts	fall	under	the	umbrella	of	alethic	modality.	As	I	discussed	in	my	introduction	to	deontic	and	modal	logic,	alethic	modality	is	modality	about	how	states	of	affairs	(or	in	the	present	case,	actions)	may	occur	possibly	or	necessarily,	or	how	some	states	of	affairs	may	necessarily	lead	to	or	entail	other	states	of	affairs.	These	(i.e.	logical	and	causal)	types	of	modality	
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diverge	in	more	than	way.	On	the	one	hand,	an	action	(or	state	of	affairs)	may	logically	entail	another	based	on	how	it’s	phrased.	If	“A”	stands	for	“the	agent	in	question	bandages	the	man	(Robert)	who	will	be	robbed	by	Benjamin”	(example	from	Castañeda	14),	then	A	entails	B	by	first-order	logic,	where	“B”	stands	for	“Benjamin	robs	Robert.”	One	of	course	would	not	say	that	A	caused	B	to	happen	in	any	serious	sense.	This	particular	case	illuminates	a	problem	with	considering	(PDE)	as	addressing	logical	entailment,	which	I	will	discuss	later.	Logical	modality	concerns	statements	either	of	actions	or	states	of	affairs	that	have	modal	status	due	to	their	construction.	All	sentences	of	the	form	“p	v	~p,”	for	example,	are	logically	necessary.	Causal	modality	can	be	taken	as	identical	to	physical	(or	perhaps	factual)	modality.	It	will	typically	incorporate	some	temporal	consideration.	The	principle	is	that	a	state	of	affairs	(or	action)	A	is	necessary	if,	given	the	actual	state	of	the	universe	at	some	point	in	time	t,	A	obtains	in	every	possible	subsequent	universal	state	of	affairs.	Logical	modality	is	universal:	A	logically	valid	statement	holds	in	every	possible	world.	Logical	truths	are	fact-independent,	so	no	state	of	affairs	will	preclude	a	given	logical	necessity.	How	does	this	apply	to	Robert	and	Benjamin?	Obviously	it	is	not	logically	necessary	that	Benjamin	rob	Robert.	Rather,	the	conditional	“If	I	bandage	the	man	whom	Benjamin	will	rob,	and	that	man	is	Robert,	then	Benjamin	will	rob	Robert.”	It	is	entirely	plausible	that	Benjamin	does	not	rob	Robert,	in	which	case	the	antecedent	of	this	conditional	comes	out	false,	since	I	did	not	bandage	the	man	Benjamin	robbed.	I	bandaged	Robert.	In	the	case	of	causal	worlds,	access	is	temporally	ordered.	Universal	states	of	affairs	hold	at	different	times,	and	each	
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instant	accesses	future	states,	i.e.	possible	worlds.	So	modally-considered	statements	always	apply	to	future	worlds.	The	question	remains	of	how	to	interpret	the	principle	of	deontic	entailment	when	its	formal	statement,	“£(A	⊃	B)	⊃	(OA	⊃	
OB),”	is	ambiguous.	Consider	the	following	situation:	I	promise	to	drive	a	friend	to	the	bank.	Unbeknownst	to	me,	my	friend	intends	to	rob	the	bank.	I	have	no	reason	to	believe	this.	At	least	up	to	my	knowledge,	I	have	an	obligation	to	drive	my	friend	to	the	bank.	Suppose	that,	if	I	do	not	drive	him,	he	will	not	rob	the	bank.	Then	it	is	clear	that	my	driving	him	causally	guarantees	that	he	robs	the	bank.	Assuming	I	have	an	obligation	to	keep	my	promises	(at	least	when	I	have	no	reason	to	believe	doing	so	will	bring	about	ill	effect),	I	am	obligated	to	drive	my	friend	to	the	bank.	My	doing	so	causes	me	to	take	a	second	action,	though	not	intentionally:	I	assist	my	friend	in	robbing	a	bank.	Clearly,	I	do	not	have	an	obligation	to	enable	my	friend’s	robbery.	I	likely	have	an	obligation	to	attempt	to	prevent	it.	Here,	“A”	stands	for	“I	drive	my	friend	to	the	bank”	and	“B”	for	“I	enable	my	friend’s	robbing	the	bank.”	Clearly,	the	antecedent	“£(A	⊃	B)”	holds,	since	my	driving	guarantees	the	robbery	takes	place.	Since	I	have	an	obligation	to	take	action	A,	(PDE)	would	give	the	result	that	I	have	a	duty	to	help	my	friend	rob	the	bank.	Since	that	is	obviously	not	the	case,	one	has	reason	to	scrutinize	the	situation,	or	else	to	reject	(PDE)	for	cases	of	causal	entailment.	One	particular	point	of	this	example	sticks	out.	When	I	claim	that	I	have	an	obligation	to	fulfill	my	promise,	this	is	presumably	because	I	am	unaware	of	the	unfortunate	consequences	of	the	action	(under	some	theories,	my	obligation	will	
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withstand	the	exposure	of	my	friend’s	larcenous	intentions,	but	it	is	at	least	plausible	that	full	knowledge	of	the	relevant	facts	will	eliminate	my	duty).	What	deontic	facts	will	change	if	I	know	my	friend’s	intentions?	Presumably,	I	will	no	longer	have	an	obligation	to	drive	him.	My	promise-keeping	obligation	may	be	overridden	by	a	separate	obligation	to	prevent	a	robbery,	at	least	given	that	preventing	the	robbery	involves	negligible	effort	on	my	part.	The	question	for	(PDE)	is	whether	my	not	having	an	obligation	to	aid	in	a	robbery	is	sufficient	justification	for	the	claim	that	I	cannot	have	an	obligation	to	drive	my	friend	to	the	bank.	If	this	were	the	case,	though,	I	presumably	would	not	have	had	the	obligation	to	drive	my	friend	in	the	original	case,	according	to	(PDE).	Perhaps	I	can	only	have	obligations	in	cases	where	my	knowledge	of	the	relevant	facts	is	complete.	That	position	seems	reasonable,	but	it	has	problematic	implications.	Under	such	a	view,	agents	will	face	numerous	situations	in	which	they	become	morally	responsible	for	the	unforeseeable	results	of	their	actions.	If	a	theory	of	morality	is	properly	action-guiding,	it	cannot	demand	agents	act	on	knowledge	they	do	not	possess.	This	would	be	something	like	rejecting	ought-implies-can.	An	obligation	to	take	some	action	without	having	a	reason	is	similar	to	a	duty	to	do	the	impossible.	The	obligation	is	inert.	Assuming	an	actor’s	ignorance	is	not	willful,	one	would	not	consider	action	taken	without	full	knowledge	as	blameworthy	or	warranting	rebuke.	I	think	most	people	have	a	strong	intuition	that	agents	are	responsible	for	foreseeable	results	but	not	the	unforeseeable	results	of	their	actions,	but	I	will	offer	a	clarificatory	example.	
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Suppose	Michael	is	walking	along	beside	a	pond	when	he	sees	a	child	struggling	in	the	water.	It	is	clear	that	if	he	does	not	help	the	child,	she	will	drown.	It	will	be	no	great	burden	on	him	to	rescue	the	child;	Michael	is	a	strong	swimmer	and	can	easily	pull	her	to	shore.	Any	theory	that	admits	positive	obligations	(obligations	to	take,	rather	than	only	forbear	actions)	will	require	that	Michael	save	the	girl.	Unbeknownst	to	Michael,	just	around	the	next	bend	in	the	road	is	another	pond	with	five	young	children	drowning.	If	Michael	were	aware	of	these	children’s	plight,	he	could	save	them.	If	he	saves	the	girl	in	the	first	pond,	he	will	be	too	late	to	rescue	the	others.	The	intuition	is	clear	in	the	first	case	that	Michael	must	rescue	the	girl.	Were	he	aware	of	the	other	children’s	situation,	he	would	certainly	have	an	obligation	to	rescue	them.	Whenever	he	has	an	obligation	to	rescue	the	others,	it	is	at	least	plausible	that	he	has	an	obligation	to	rescue	the	others	instead	of	the	girl.	Plausibility	is	enough	here:	If	(PDE)	is	a	fundamental	axiom	of	normative	considerations,	then	any	reasonable	moral	theory	will	be	subject	to	it.	There	are	reasonable	moral	theories	under	which	saving	five	lives	is	preferable	to	saving	one.	Suppose	Michael	has	an	obligation	to	rescue	the	five	children	in	spite	of	his	ignorance.	Obviously,	he	cannot	do	so	without	continuing	past	the	drowning	girl	in	the	pond.	In	that	case,	Michael	is	not	only	permitted,	but	actually	obligated	to	walk	past	the	child	drowning	in	the	pond,	although	he	has	no	reason	to	believe	his	actions	will	lead	to	his	rescuing	more	children.	This	is	plainly	an	unacceptable	conclusion.		 In	the	above	case,	it	is	clear	that	morality	requires	Michael	to	take	those	actions	that	he	is	obligated	to	take	up	to	his	knowledge.	To	return	to	the	bank	robbery	example,	it	is	now	clear	that	my	original	obligation	to	keep	my	promise	was	
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genuine.	The	unforeseeable	consequences	of	my	action	do	not	have	deontic	status	(assuming	my	ignorance,	like	Michael’s,	is	not	due	to	an	unreasonable	interpretation	of	those	facts	available	to	me).	In	that	case,	the	supporter	of	a	causally-interpreted	(PDE)	may	simply	claim	that	the	modal	operator	in	the	principle’s	formal	statement	must	be	taken	to	apply	only	up	to	reasonable	knowledge	of	the	situation.	This	objection	seems	palatable,	but	it	fails	in	the	end.	Suppose	Kim	is	driving	down	the	road.	She	sees	a	child	in	the	road	and	swerves	to	avoid	hitting	him.	She	is	aware	that	in	so	doing,	she	will	hit	a	mailbox.	She	can	see	the	mailbox	before	she	swerves,	but	of	course	would	prefer	destroying	property	to	killing	or	injuring	the	child.	She	clearly	has	an	obligation	not	to	hit	the	child.		Is	it	right	to	say	Kim	is	obligated	to	hit	a	person’s	mailbox?	Kim’s	swerving	is	purely	instrumental	to	fulfilling	her	obligation.	When	she	swerves,	she	is	doing	so	only	in	order	to	avoid	hitting	the	child.	Her	real	obligation	is	not	to	take	some	physical	action,	but	to	avoid	causing	a	child’s	death.	It	is	reasonable	to	say	that	instrumental	actions	are	morally	required	when	they	are	necessary	antecedents	to	fulfilling	primary	obligations.	In	fact,	very	few	primary	obligations	deal	with	first-order	acts	like	turning	a	steering	wheel	within	a	certain	time	frame.	Instrumental	obligations	are	secondary,	but	genuine	moral	duties.	Kim’s	hitting	the	mailbox	is	not	instrumental	to	her	not	striking	the	child,	however.	According	to	the	logical	model	for	temporal	ordering	and	causal	modality,	later	actions	cannot	causally	determine	previous	ones.	Nor	should	they	be	able	to.	To	say	so	would	be	to	assault	common	sense.	Thus,	there	is	no	sense	in	which	Kim’s	hitting	the	mailbox,	which	takes	place	
after	her	obligation	not	to	hit	the	child	is	fulfilled,	is	causally	responsible	for	the	
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child’s	safety.	Rather,	the	two	share	a	common	cause.	Kim’s	instrumental	action	of	swerving	her	car	just	so	(an	action	which	is	itself	obligatory)	causally	determines	both	that	she	fulfills	her	duty	to	avoid	the	child	and	that	she	hit	the	mailbox.	The	question	that	remains	is	whether	secondary	duties	to	perform	certain	instrumental	actions	can	generate	further	duties	to	take	causally	determined	actions	(specifically	those	later	in	time).	It	is	clear	that	instrumental	duties	have	some	powers	of	conferral.	Kim’s	obligation	to	move	her	hands	and	feet	in	a	certain	way	is	inherited	from	her	obligation	to	swerve	her	car.	This	inheritance	occurs	retroactively.	That	is	to	say,	if	an	action	A	is	obligatory	and	an	action	B	is	causally	
required	to	execute	A,	then	B	is	obligatory.	There	seems	to	be	no	reason	to	suppose	that	the	same	principle	would	hold	of	those	actions	that	come	about	as	unintended	(but	predictable)	results	of	obligatory	actions.	Presumably,	the	child	in	Kim’s	case	will	be	distraught	by	the	ordeal.	If	he	cries,	one	would	not	say	that	Kim	was	obligated	to	see	to	it	that	he	does	so.	Rather,	this	is	a	result	preferable	to	his	death,	but	by	no	means	morally	required.	Kim’s	example	illustrates	that	obligation	can	be	causally	inherited,	but	only	when	the	inheriting	action	is	causally	required	to	execute	the	content	of	the	primary	obligation.	Assuming	one	accepts	causal	determination	at	least	at	the	macroscopic	physical	level,	one	must	acknowledge	that	our	actions	have	vastly	far-reaching	and	intricate	causal	results.	To	claim	that	morality	prescribes	all	such	results	of	any	obligatory	action	is	to	needlessly	overpopulate	one’s	ethical	ontology.	If	there	is	no	good	reason	to	believe	that	actions	confer	their	deontic	status	forward	in	time,	and	
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if	denying	the	same	does	not	invalidate	any	strongly	held	moral	intuitions,	one	ought	to	reject	the	principle.		What	becomes	of	(PDE)	on	this	view?	A	more	discursive	semantics	for	the	particular	brand	of	causal	modality	in	question	may	allow	a	useful	formalization	of	the	principle,	but	strict	temporally	ordered	causation	will	not	suffice.	On	the	other	hand,	the	present	formation	of	(PDE)	may	hold	when	the	modal	operators	are	interpreted	differently.	As	I	mentioned	before,	the	relationship	of	promises	to	their	contents	is	neatly	captured	by	the	principle,	so	it	clearly	has	some	value	as	a	foundational	concept	in	ethics.	This	use	does	give	rise	to	an	important	worry	about	how	one	ought	to	formulate	actions	when	using	the	principle	this	way.	Earlier,	I	invoked	Hector	Castañeda’s	example	with	Benjamin	and	Robert.	With	this	case	in	mind,	the	reader	will	likely	have	a	good	idea	of	where	the	problem	arises.	If	one	phrases	one’s	description	as,	“Arthur	bandages	the	man	(Robert)	whom	Benjamin	will	Rob,”	then	Benjamin’s	robbing	Robert	is	entailed,	and	obligatory	when	Arthur’s	ministrations	are	obligatory.	I	will	echo	Castañeda’s	solution	to	the	quandary,	and	conclude	with	a	brief	description	of	how	moral	dilemmas	hold	up	given	the	rejection	of	(PDE)’s	original	interpretation.	In	his	discussion,	Canstañeda	defines	what	he	calls	“acts	prescriptively	considered”	as	acts	which	can	be	accurately	mirrored	in	the	imperative	mood	or	“mandate”	form	(19-21).	In	so	doing,	he	details	a	number	of	tests	whereby	linguistic	mirroring	of	statements	into	the	imperative	mood	illuminates	whether	the	meaning	of	certain	clauses	is	captured	prescriptively	or	merely	describes	context.	I	will	not	give	a	full	description	of	each	of	his	tests,	but	I	think	an	example	will	clarify	his	
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rather	complex	approach.	Returning	to	the	Benjamin	and	Robert	example,	the	test	goes	thus:	The	statement	“Arthur	bandages	the	man	(Robert)	who	will	be	robbed	by	Benjamin”	entails	“Benjamin	will	rob	Robert.”	To	examine	their	deontic	relationship,	however,	we	must	consider	each	statement	as	a	mandate.	The	imperative	“Arthur,	bandage	the	man	(Robert)	who	will	be	robbed	by	Benjamin”	does	not	entail	“Benjamin,	rob	Robert”	(Castañeda	21).	Our	analysis	shows	that	in	the	case	of	language	considered	descriptively,	logical	entailment	holds,	and	(PDE)	would	seem	to	apply	if	it	ever	does	for	logical	entailment.	Benjamin’s	robbing	Robert	is	not	an	act	prescriptively	considered,	however.	The	mandate	tests	reveal	this	caveat,	allowing	us	to	adhere	to	the	intuitive	maxim	that	descriptions	of	context	must	not	lead	us	to	paradoxes	of	ethics.	With	the	primary	worry	for	(PDE)’s	application	to	logical	conditionals	out	of	the	way,	all	that	remains	is	to	consider	what	remains	of	the	principle’s	value	for	a	system	of	deontic	logic.	Consider	the	case	of	promises.	Obviously,	any	correct	formal	paraphrase	of	“I	fulfill	my	promise	to	visit	my	friend	on	Thursday”	will	entail	“I	visit	my	friend	on	Thursday.”	When	we	apply	Castañeda’s	test,	we	discover	that	the	mandate,	“Samuel,	fulfill	your	promise	to	visit	your	friend	on	Thursday”	implies	the	mandate,	“Samuel,	visit	your	friend	on	Thursday.”	Thus,	the	original	motivation	for	the	principle	of	deontic	entailment	is	still	satisfied.	One	can	meaningfully	claim	that	holding	to	commitments	implies	executing	their	contents.	Other	cases	where	duties	generate	other	duties	may	arise.	In	all	such	situations,	however,	it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	descriptions	of	acts	with	moral	status	and	descriptions	of	states	of	affairs	providing	context	for	those	prescriptively	considered	acts.	The	mandate	
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tests	provide	a	useful	mechanism	for	dismissing	those	parts	of	act-descriptions	that	lack	deontic	status.	Any	case	in	which	actions	A	and	B	are	subject	to	(PDE)’s	legitimate	application	will	clearly	involve	considering	A	and	B	prescriptively,	and	thus	pass	Castañeda’s	test.		In	the	end,	(PDE)	survives	criticism,	but	in	a	somewhat	weaker	sense	than	its	original	presentation.	The	dilemma	actions	A	and	B	are	each	considered	prescriptively	in	their	individual	statements,	but	no	formulation	of	either	will	involve	a	prescriptive	account	of	the	other.	This	is	because	the	actions	are	only	
contingently	incompatible.	A’s	incompatibility	with	B	is	contextual	to	B’s	deontic	status.	“I	do	A,	after	which	I	cannot	do	B”	entails	“I	do	not	do	B,”	but	the	pairing	fails	the	mandate	test.	This	makes	sense,	since	“A	&	B”	dilemmas	are	more	intuitively	plausible	than	“A	&	~A”	dilemmas	exactly	because	the	actions	have	no	intrinsic	connection	when	considered	deontically.	Likewise,	I	am	unable	to	execute	both	A	and	B	through	any	available	course	of	action,	but	my	forbearance	of	each	is	a	causal	result	of	my	performance	of	the	other,	so	instrumental	inheritance	fails,	as	well.	One	can	have	one’s	deontic	cake	and	eat	it,	too,	since	I	have	preserved	most	of	(PDE)’s	usefulness	while	eliminating	its	effect	on	contingent	dilemmas.	
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Chapter	5	-	Conclusion	and	Implications	
	 I	have	thus	far	discussed	what	are	widely	regarded	as	the	strongest	structural	critiques	of	dilemma-producing	moral	theories.	If	these	arguments	were	to	succeed,	that	would	imply	any	theory	that	tolerated	genuine	dilemmas	had	an	inconsistent	basis.	The	arguments	in	the	preceding	chapters	attempt	to	expose	contradictory	results	of	dilemmas.	If	dilemmas	have	contradictory	results,	any	set	of	ethical	theorems	that	accommodate	dilemmas	will	imply	the	same	contradictions.	I	have	argued	that	we	do	not	have	adequate	reason	to	accept	the	axioms	of	agglomeration	and	ought-implies-can	as	logically	fundamental	to	ethics.	That	is	to	say,	there	may	exist	logically	consistent	ethical	theories	that	exclude	these	axioms.	In	the	second	argument,	I	acknowledged	that	both	the	principle	of	deontic	consistency	and	the	principle	of	deontic	entailment	were	sound	logical	analyses	of	basic	moral	reasoning.	The	principle	of	deontic	entailment	should	not	apply	to	every	sort	of	modal	conditional,	however.	Rather,	I	argued	that	the	scope	of	the	principle	was	specifically	classical	logical	entailment.	After	clearing	up	some	possible	worries	with	that	interpretation,	I	concluded	that	the	principle	of	deontic	entailment	still	gave	us	much	of	what	we	needed	in	terms	of	its	application	to	promises	and	generic	versus	particular	actions.	Though	causal	results	do	not	inherit	deontic	status,	an	action	may	be	required	or	forbidden	if	it	is	causally	instrumental	to	fulfilling	or	violating	an	obligation.	A	logical	analysis	of	this	inheritance	would	require	a	formal	logic	of	ability	and	instrumentality.	It	is	not	within	the	scope	of	this	project	to	develop	such	a	system.	Regardless,	any	such	system	would	not	categorize	horns	of	
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dilemmas	as	instrumentally	related.	Rather,	forbearing	the	action	required	by	one	horn	of	the	dilemma	is	a	regrettable	result	of	the	same	actions	instrumental	to	fulfilling	the	other.	If	the	reader	is	at	least	convinced	that	it	is	plausible	to	deny	those	axioms	I	have	discussed	(or	the	relevant	applications	thereof),	then	she	has	reason	to	reject	them	as	axioms,	since	axioms	by	definition	capture	fundamental	logical	laws.	If	the	logic	of	imperative	ethics	does	not	require	these	principles,	they	have	their	place	as	potential	theorems	within	specific	ethical	theories.	They	should	not	be	taken	as	foundational	to	a	basic	logic	of	ethics	applicable	to	any	theory,	which	is	required	to	judge	the	consistency	of	an	entire	theory.	If	one	rejects	these	axioms	and	accepts	that	dilemmas	are	possible,	what	comes	next?	The	notion	of	genuine,	irresolvable	dilemmas	goes	against	certain	of	our	intuitions	about	moral	responsibility	and	culpability.	Questions	of	blameworthiness	arise.	One	will	wish	to	know	just	what	sorts	of	moral	attitudes	one	should	have	to	dilemmas	and	dilemmatic	choosers.	I	will	here	address	these	questions,	and	attempt	to	provide	a	satisfactory	account	of	the	conceptual	status	of	dilemma-producing	theories.	I	will	begin	by	giving	a	more	concrete	example	of	just	what	qualifies	as	a	dilemma.	Such	a	situation	must	involve	two	equally	powerful	obligations,	each	individually	inescapable	(at	least	given	the	agent’s	possible	courses	of	action).	An	agent	finds	himself	in	a	situation	where	he	must	choose	one	or	the	other	of	the	two	actions,	and	cannot	take	both.	The	actions	must	not	be	logically	antithetical	to	one	another,	but	only	contingently	incompatible.	A	few	of	the	examples	I	have	discussed	
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previously	may	fall	under	this	description,	but	I	will	offer	one	that	I	believe	illuminates	the	important	aspects	of	dilemmas.	Consider	the	following:	Edward	is	kidnapped	and	knocked	unconscious.	He	awakens	to	find	himself	in	a	room	with	two	other	people.	One	is	his	nephew,	the	other	a	total	stranger.	They	are	both	tied	up.	Edward	finds	on	his	person	a	gun	and	a	note	signed	by	the	kidnapper.	The	note	commands	him	to	kill	the	stranger,	or	else	the	kidnapper	will	kill	Edward’s	nephew,	who	is	wearing	a	collar	capable	of	delivering	a	lethal	(but	minimally	painful)	shock.	If	the	collar	is	removed,	it	will	explode,	killing	everyone	present.	Edward	has	ten	minutes	to	make	his	choice,	after	which	time	the	kidnapper	will	release	whomever	remains	alive.	The	signature	identifies	the	kidnapper	as	a	notorious	criminal.	His	reputation	makes	Edward	confident	that	the	contents	of	the	note	are	true	and	that	the	criminal	will	fulfill	his	promises.	Edward	obviously	has	an	obligation	not	to	kill.	Under	any	plausible	moral	theory,	he	will	also	have	an	obligation	to	rescue	his	family	members	from	serious	harm	or	death.	I	claim	that	it	is	at	least	plausible	that	neither	of	these	obligations	overrides	the	other	in	this	case.	The	most	likely	reasons	the	reader	might	give	if	they	think	Edward	cannot	have	both	obligations	are	the	following:	Edward	cannot	fulfill	both	obligations,	so	it	does	not	make	sense	to	suppose	that	neither	can	be	overridden.	This	would	certainly	be	true	if	both	the	agglomeration	principle	(OA	&	
OB	⊃	O(A	&	B))	and	the	ought-implies-can	principle	were	to	hold.	I	have	argued	that	neither	is	fundamental	to	the	logic	of	ethics.	As	long	as	the	reader	accepts	that	a	logically	consistent	moral	theory	could	reject	one	or	the	other	(or	both)	of	these	
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principles,	the	reader	cannot	maintain	that	Edward	must	be	able	to	discharge	one	of	his	duties	in	this	case.	Up	to	plausibility,	theories	need	not	adhere	to	these	principles,	and	so	they	need	not	reject	dilemmas.	I	do	not	suppose	that	Edward	follows	any	particular	moral	theory,	in	order	to	consider	the	ramifications	of	his	situation	under	theories	that	admit	dilemmas.	The	other	possible	reason	to	say	that	Edward	cannot	have	these	obligations	in	conjunction	is	to	say,	“If	Edward	refrains	from	killing	a	(presumably	innocent)	stranger,	Edward	will	bring	about	his	nephew’s	death.	Since	he	must	refrain	from	killing	the	stranger,	Edward	must	bring	about	his	nephew’s	death.	However,	Edward	obviously	has	a	duty	to	rescue	his	nephew.	This	is	a	clear	contradiction,	since	Edward	is	both	required	and	forbidden	to	take	the	same	action	(namely	bringing	about	his	nephew’s	death).	As	the	reader	will	recall	from	the	last	chapter,	however,	I	argued	against	an	interpretation	principle	of	deontic	entailment	whereby	one	action’s	causing	another	and	the	first	action’s	obligatoriness	implies	the	resultant	action’s	obligatoriness.	Given	that	the	principle	should	only	be	taken	to	apply	in	cases	of	logical	entailment,	Edward’s	obligation	not	to	kill	the	stranger	does	not	imply	an	obligation	to	bring	about	his	nephew’s	death.	Were	he	to	refrain	from	the	killing,	he	would	in	fact	be	violating	his	obligation	not	to	allow	his	nephew	to	die.	It	can	be	assumed	that	either	person’s	death	(the	stranger’s	or	the	nephew’s)	will	have	roughly	the	same	effect	on	the	world,	in	terms	of	loved	ones	who	grieve	and	goods	that	will	never	be	achieved.	One	might	contend	that	Edward’s	obligations	to	his	nephew	are	stronger	than	those	to	strangers,	but	it	is	also	plausible	that	Edward’s	obligation	not	to	kill	is	stronger	than	his	obligation	to	save	a	life.	On	
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balance,	the	obligations	seem	to	be	at	least	roughly	equally	pressing.	In	short,	this	case	is	an	example	of	a	genuine	moral	dilemma.	Moreover,	this	example	accurately	represents	many	of	the	difficulties	in	dealing	with	dilemmas.	The	first	point	to	notice	is	the	tragedy	of	the	situation,	and	the	sense	of	Edward’s	being	forced	into	an	impossibly	difficult	choice.	In	this	particular	example,	a	second	agent	is	responsible	for	creating	the	dilemma.	One	could	imagine	cases	where	Edward	finds	himself	in	a	similar	predicament,	but	no	person	is	to	blame	for	his	position.	Alternatively,	there	are	numerous	examples	of	agents	getting	themselves	into	dilemmatic	situations.	I	will	discuss	just	such	a	case	shortly.	Consider	Edward’s	possible	courses	of	action	in	this	case.	Assume	he	has	no	hope	of	escaping	without	playing	the	kidnapper’s	game.	He	has	just	the	two	choices,	then.	He	can	shoot	the	stranger,	saving	his	nephew.	In	that	case,	he	commits	a	murder,	and	it	does	not	seem	a	stretch	to	say	that	he	wrongs	the	stranger.	I	will	explore	just	what	it	means	to	wrong	an	individual	shortly.	In	this	case,	it	coincides	with	an	all-things-considered	moral	wrong,	since	Edward	has	an	all-things-considered	obligation	not	to	kill,	and	he	violated	that	obligation.	Suppose	Edward	kills	the	stranger.	Given	that	this	is	a	true	instance	of	a	moral	dilemma,	Edward	has	acted	wrongly	in	a	certain	sense;	he	has	committed	a	wrong.	On	the	other	hand,	it	seems	strange	to	say	that	Edward	is	guilty	of	anything	besides	choosing	one	of	two	equally	abhorrent	alternatives	given	him.	If	anyone	is	at	fault	in	this	situation,	the	kidnapper	is	the	obvious	choice.	Can	a	dilemma-producing	theory	fully	deflect	moral	responsibility	onto	the	kidnapper,	though?	Can	it?	Let	us	first	consider	the	other	alternative.	
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Suppose	Edward	cannot	bring	himself	to	kill	the	stranger.	He	declares	this,	and	the	kidnapper	electrocutes	Edward’s	nephew.	Again,	Edward	has	wronged	another	person,	this	time	a	member	of	his	family.	He	has	also	committed	an	all-things-considered	wrong	in	allowing	his	nephew	to	be	killed.	In	this	case,	too,	it	would	seem	harsh	to	consider	Edward	fully	culpable	for	his	action.	We	may	even	praise	the	character	of	a	man	who	is	unable	to	bring	himself	to	kill	another.	Certainly	we	would	not	want	to	cultivate	the	opposite	instinct.	Instead,	we	regret	that	the	decision	had	to	be	made	in	the	first	place	and	seek	to	place	blame	for	its	inception,	rather	than	its	execution.	How	might	Edward	feel	after	taking	either	of	these	courses	of	action?	We,	as	neutral	parties	may	find	it	obvious	that	he	is	not	guilty	in	the	same	sense	as	he	would	be	if	he	killed	someone	(or	let	someone	die)	in	other	circumstances,	but	Edward	will	likely	be	haunted	by	his	choice,	whichever	course	he	ultimately	takes.	If	he	kills	the	stranger,	he	will	then	live	with	the	knowledge	that	he	was	the	direct	cause	of	an	innocent	person’s	death.	In	particular,	he	may	blame	himself	for	being	the	sort	of	person	who	could	pull	the	trigger	in	that	situation.	At	the	very	least,	this	will	be	a	terribly	painful	memory,	perhaps	even	similar	to	other	memories	Edward	may	have	of	times	he	violated	(presumably	less	drastic)	moral	imperatives.	Suppose,	on	the	other	hand,	that	Edward	allows	his	nephew	to	die.	He	will	then	carry	with	him	the	knowledge	that	he	was	unwilling	to	do	something	drastic	and	wrong	to	save	a	loved	one.	It	is	not	hard	to	imagine	that	this	memory	will	also	be	painful,	and	likely	lead	Edward	to	blame	himself	for	neglecting	his	duty	to	his	family.	This	feeling	again	may	even	feel	comparable	in	force	to	the	regret	one	has	when	one	
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violates	some	minor	moral	rule	(donating	less	to	charity	than	one	ought,	or	lying	when	there	is	no	real	need,	for	example).	Are	Edward’s	feelings	apt?	Certainly	we	do	not	want	to	blame	him	for	his	choice	in	the	same	way	we	would	blame	him	for	a	similar	action	in	a	non-dilemmatic	situation.	It	seems	like	a	moral	theory	that	admits	dilemmas	could	(and	perhaps	should)	maintain	some	mechanisms	for	assigning	blame	and	admonishment	for	wrongdoing,	however.	Presumably,	such	mechanisms	will	be	connected	in	some	way	to	the	violation	of	moral	duties.	It	clearly	cannot	be	a	simple	one-to-one	relationship,	however,	since	that	would	entail	that	violating	the	duty	not	to	kill	in	Edward’s	tragic	case	would	carry	the	same	weight	of	blame	and	admonishment	as	would	the	same	violation	in	less	restrictive	situation.	I	will	here	discuss	what	we	ought	to	make	of	blame	in	theories	that	allow	dilemmas,	along	with	how	it	might	be	different	to	self-blame	rather	than	assign	blame	as	external	parties.	I	will	also	touch	on	certain	related	issues,	including	questions	of	punishment	and	moral	character,	especially	as	they	connect	to	blame	and	dilemmatic	agents.	The	first	question	that	arises	in	considering	these	subjects	is	just	how	to	define	“blame.”	As	it	is	understood	in	most	philosophical	literature,	blame	is	“a	response	to	moral	agents	on	the	basis	of	their	wrong,	bad,	or	otherwise	objectionable	actions	or	characters”	(Tognazzini	and	Coates	1).	Blame	is	interpreted	variously	as	an	objective	judgment	of	character,	especially	as	it	aligns	with	an	agent’s	own	moral	views	(Haji	197),	as	an	evaluation	(against	some	standard	of	excellence)	of	an	agent’s	own	qualities	“manifested	in	thought	and	action”	(Watson	231),	and	as	strictly	interpersonal	judgments,	separate	from	any	metaphysical	
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justification	(Hieronymi	115).	These	are	classified	sometimes	as	“cognitive	theories	of	blame,”	as	they	hinge	on	judgments	or	evaluations,	rather	than	emotions	(Tognazzini	and	Coates	1.1).	Alternative	views	focus	on	holding	agents	responsible	by	reference	to	reactive	moral	emotions	(Wallace	18)	and	adding	to	a	belief	that	an	agent	did	wrong	a	desire	that	they	do	otherwise	(Sher	112).	Theories	like	these	are	called	“emotional”	and	“conative,”	respectively	(Tognazzini	and	Coates	1.2;	1.3).	It	would	be	outside	the	scope	of	this	project	to	argue	extensively	for	a	particular	theory	of	blame.	I	will	attempt	to	avoid	the	tensions	between	these	views	where	possible.	Despite	this,	I	will	rely	on	one	particular	distinction	in	the	literature	on	blame.	Kenner	argues	in	a	1967	paper	against	Smart’s	strictly	cognitive	view	of	blame.	In	the	response,	Kenner	draws	a	distinction	between	use	and	application	of	“blame”	and	“blameworthy”	(247-248).	“Blame”	in	its	ordinary	use	expresses	an	emotional	attitude	toward	a	regrettable	or	frustrating	result.	It	need	not	imply	a	moral	evaluation	(Kenner	239-240).	“Blameworthy,”	on	the	other	hand	is	more	cognitive.	Kenner	claims	that	it	is	“a	simple	statement	of	moral	condemnation”	(248).	I	maintain	that	the	term	is	slightly	more	complex	than	this,	as	“blameworthy”	is	not	merely	an	expression	of	the	moral	undesirability	of	an	action	or	poor	moral	character	of	an	agent.	It	carries	with	it	a	certain	weight,	and	may	indeed	imply	a	sort	of	moral	grade	or	a	rational	desire	for	the	agent	to	have	done	otherwise.	In	short,	blameworthiness	is	closer	to	a	cognitive	or	conative	account	of	blame,	whereas	common	usage	of	“blame”	is	often	an	expression	of	causal	connection	along	with	a	certain	negative	emotional	response.	
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What	bearing	do	theories	of	blame	have	on	my	example	with	Edward’s	dilemma?	When	we	understand	what	blame	is	and	how	it	operates,	it	becomes	much	easier	to	determine	its	application	to	specific	situations.	Is	blame	an	apt	reaction	to	wrongdoing	in	dilemmas?	Are	dilemmatic	agents	blameworthy,	and	if	not,	would	blaming	them	be	in	some	way	unfair?	In	most	cases	of	wrongdoing,	we	do	not	hesitate	to	assign	blame,	and	we	typically	consider	our	blaming	attitudes	to	be	justified.	That	is	to	say,	when	I	am	wronged	or	violated,	I	am	apt	to	blame	the	offending	party,	and	when	I	believe	that	wrong	had	a	moral	component,	I	consider	my	blame	well-placed.	Blaming	someone	for	her	actions	seems	less	appropriate	in	situations	where	she	was	not	in	full	control	of	those	actions,	however.	Kenner	touches	somewhat	upon	this	issue	when	he	argues	that	we	can	blame	a	compulsive	but	incompetent	driver	for	accidents	he	causes,	but	we	cannot	blame	a	man	who	has	a	heart	attack	while	driving	(241-242).	Thus,	there	is	a	certain	sense	in	which	unavoidable	actions	cannot	be	subject	to	blame.	If	an	agent	truly	has	no	choice	in	his	action,	and	his	restriction	is	not	the	result	of	some	prior	negligence	or	weakness	of	character,	then	we	are	inclined	to	say	that	he	must	not	be	blamed.	Kenner	maintains	that	we	expect	people	to	avoid	certain	dispositions,	like	compulsively	driving	cars	if	one	is	inept	at	driving.	This	view	motivates	a	somewhat	stricter	requirement	to	release	an	agent	from	blame.	One	can	blame	an	actor	whose	involuntary	or	unavoidable	action	arose	out	of	a	situation	that	one	would	normally	expect	the	actor	to	avoid,	but	not	when	the	actor	was	in	the	situation	through	no	fault	of	his	own.	This	allows	one	to	explain	and	
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corroborate	the	intuition	that	one	can	blame	irresponsible	agents	when	their	negligence	gets	them	into	situations	where	they	cannot	help	but	cause	harm.	This	approach	will	run	into	problems	as	we	consider	more	carefully	what	falls	into	the	realm	of	reasonable	expectations.	Are	people	with	diagnosable	behavioral	disabilities	to	be	blamed	for	negligence	of	character?	It	would	seem	unfair	to	say	so.	In	any	case,	Edward’s	situation	is	not	quite	like	those.	Edward	finds	himself	forced,	through	no	fault	of	his	own	to	choose	a	course	of	action	that,	under	certain	plausible	moral	theories,	will	be	morally	wrong.	Which	choice	he	makes	has	little	moral	significance,	since	each	is	wrong,	and	the	two	duties	are	equally	pressing.	Whichever	course	he	takes,	however,	he	has	made	some	choice.	If	he	kills	the	stranger,	he	has	elected	to	do	so.	A	course	of	action	was	available	to	him	in	which	he	would	not	commit	that	murder.	Likewise,	if	he	lets	his	nephew	die,	he	is	electing	not	to	follow	a	path	that	would	result	in	his	nephew’s	rescue.	The	task	before	us	is	to	make	sense	of	just	how	Edward	is	and	is	not	free	to	choose	in	this	case.	 The	reader	may	already	have	noticed	that	it	would	be	fairly	straightforward	to	say	that	Edward	was	not	free	to	do	otherwise	than	he	does	if	we	could	formulate	his	duties	and	actions	disjunctively.	If	we	are	to	blame	him	for	the	wrong	act	of	either	killing	a	stranger	or	letting	his	nephew	die,	then	we	are	clearly	in	the	wrong.	Edward	could	not	but	take	one	of	those	actions,	so	he	could	not	avoid	taking	the	action	consisting	of	their	disjunction.	It	is	not	clear	that	this	move	would	be	valid,	however.	Just	as	the	agglomeration	of	duties	fails	to	stand	against	counterexamples,	we	cannot	interpret	choices	disjunctively.	The	problem	here	is	plain	when	one	
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considers	the	ramifications	of	making	obligations	disjunctive.	Suppose	I	have	an	obligation	to	care	for	my	family	to	the	best	of	my	ability	and	a	separate	obligation	not	to	murder.	If	one	construes	these	obligations	as	disjunctive,	it	becomes	obvious	that	that	approach	is	untenable.	I	could	fulfill	the	obligation	to	take	either	of	those	actions	by	taking	one	action	and	not	the	other.	If	we	claim,	as	I	suggested,	that	one	could	interpret	the	disjunctive	obligation	as	dismissing	the	individual	ones,	we	must	say	that	that	result	is	correct.	But	of	course	this	is	not	the	case.	I	may	well	have	this	disjunctive	obligation,	just	as	Edward	may	well	be	obligated	to	either	save	his	nephew	or	the	stranger,	but	each	individual	obligation	remains	in	force.	Thus,	the	problem	of	Edward’s	blameworthiness	remains.		Unfortunately	for	Edward,	he	finds	himself	in	a	peculiar	situation	where	he	can	choose	not	to	do	any	particular	wrong	(and	so	will	be	blameworthy	when	he	does	violate	an	obligation),	but	he	cannot	help	but	do	some	wrong	(and	so	may	presumably	be	exonerated	of	blame).	It	is	unclear	what	to	make	of	a	situation	in	which	someone	violates	an	obligation	but	does	not	deserve	blame	for	it.	Any	sense	of	“obligation”	under	which	this	was	true	would	be	quite	a	weak	one.	What	is	at	play	here	then	is	not	excuse	from	blame	entirely,	but	rather	a	distinction	between	two	types	of	blame	one	might	assign.	It	will	be	important	to	be	clear	in	exactly	what	actions	and	consequences	Edward	is	responsible	for.	In	this	particular	case,	some	blame	will	land	with	the	kidnapper,	as	one	would	expect.	I	will	also	address	how	one	ought	to	interpret	this	discussion	as	it	applies	to	cases	where	a	dilemma	arises	separately	from	any	agents’	actions.	
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In	Edward’s	case,	he	is	responsible	for	the	death	of	whichever	of	the	victims	he	chooses	not	to	save.	His	actions	guarantee	the	person’s	death,	and	the	victim	would	not	die	if	Edward	did	not	take	that	particular	action.	Whichever	action	he	takes	will	amount	to	a	killing,	either	directly	killing	the	stranger	or	by	failing	to	save	his	nephew	when	it	was	within	his	power	to	do	so.	He	is	clearly	not	responsible	for	bringing	it	about	that	some	obligation	is	violated,	however.	In	this	particular	case,	the	kidnapper	is	responsible	for	that.	Because	of	his	actions,	one	of	two	people	will	certainly	die,	and	if	he	acted	otherwise,	neither	would	presumably	be	in	any	danger.	It	is	entirely	possible	that	in	other	examples	of	dilemmas,	no	one	will	be	responsible	in	this	way.	It	is	only	because	Edward’s	circumstances	are	the	result	of	someone’s	actions	that	any	party	is	blameworthy	for	this	second-order	wrong.	If	there	were	no	kidnapper,	we	would	say	that	Edward’s	finding	himself	in	this	situation	was	an	unfortunate	and	tragic	matter	of	circumstance,	but	his	own	moral	situation	would	be	unchanged.	His	situation	would	still	constitute	a	dilemma,	so	he	would	still	be	responsible	for	his	actions	as	much	as	in	the	actual	case.	He	would	not	fill	in	the	kidnapper’s	role,	however.	The	question	of	whose	fault	it	is	that	he	finds	himself	in	such	dire	straits	would	have	a	simple	answer:	“nobody’s.”	What	remains	in	this	investigation	is	to	work	out	just	how	blame	might	be	assigned,	and	how	to	interpret	the	different	sorts	of	blame	at	play	for	Edward’s	and	the	kidnapper’s	actions.	Hieronymi,	following	Strawson,	locates	the	assignment	of	blame	in	judgments	of	ill	will	toward	others	on	the	part	of	the	offending	party	(120).	Many	moral	theories	are	more	concerned	with	actions	and	effects	themselves	than	with	
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will,	and	so	when	blame	has	a	moral	component,	it	may	well	involve	judgments	and	attitudes	toward	actions	rather	than	states	of	the	will.	In	Edward’s	case,	it	would	seem	strange	to	claim	that	he	bore	ill	will	toward	either	of	his	fellow	kidnapping	victims.	On	Hieronymi’s	view,	Edward	would	presumably	be	free	of	all	blame,	unless	we	interpret	“ill	will”	quite	loosely.	This	view	is	attractive,	especially	since	it	exonerates	Edward	and	accounts	for	the	fact	that	his	obligations	are	owed	to	the	particular	people	involved.	He	may	have	a	general	obligation	not	to	kill,	but	the	particular	wrong	he	commits	under	either	choice	is	against	an	individual	who	has	a	certain	moral	claim	against	him.	However,	many	moral	theories	will	consider	actions	that	cause	harm	to	be	wrong	even	when	unaccompanied	by	ill	will.	In	such	cases,	agents	may	well	be	blamed	who	had	no	particular	feelings	toward	the	victims	of	their	actions.	In	Kenner’s	case	of	the	incompetent	driver,	for	example,	it	is	safe	to	assume	that	the	guilty	man	bears	no	ill	will	toward	the	victims	of	his	crashes.	Nonetheless,	he	is	culpable	for	his	negligence	and	invites	blame	when	he	does	wrong.	It	may	seem	attractive	to	say	that	the	difference	lies	not	in	an	agent’s	malicious	intent,	but	in	the	direction	of	the	duties	in	question.	Edward	has	particular	duties	to	each	of	his	fellow	kidnapping	victims.	The	kidnapper	has	similar	obligations,	but	he	may	violate	an	undirected	obligation	not	to	bring	about	more	wrongdoing.	In	that	case,	one	might	say	that	Edward	is	culpable	for	wronging	whichever	person	he	kills,	but	not	blameworthy	in	an	objective	sense.	Then	the	wronged	party	and	any	peripheral	parties	affected	will	have	grounds	to	blame	Edward	and	seek	recourse,	but	he	should	perhaps	not	be	judged	morally	bankrupt	
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in	the	same	way	he	would	be	were	he	responsible	for	getting	himself	into	the	situation	to	begin	with	(I	will	discuss	that	possibility	in	greater	detail	shortly).	It	will	be	helpful	to	consider	how	this	sort	of	blame	might	work.	If	the	culpable	agent	were	not	in	a	dilemma	situation,	one	would	of	course	be	inclined	to	blame	him	for	his	transgressions,	regardless	of	who	was	wronged.	This	blame	has	two	components.	It	involves	a	judgment	that	the	agent	acted	in	a	way	that	indicates	poor	moral	character,	as	well	as	an	emotional	feeling	of	indignation	on	behalf	of	the	wronged	party.	The	first	component	involves	an	objective	judgment.	One	blames	in	this	sense	when	one	holds	the	blamed	party	responsible	for	violating	some	duty	in	a	case	where	they	could	have	avoided	doing	so.	The	second	sense	of	blaming	does	not	suppose	an	all-things-considered	wrong	is	committed.	It	consists	in	a	sense	of	personal	connection	or	empathy	with	the	wronged	party,	and	the	feeling	of	indignation	is	rooted	in	the	victim’s	being	violated.	This	emotional	reaction	may	come	alongside	an	indictment	of	character	or	call	for	redress	against	the	culpable	party,	but	it	does	not	constitute	a	judgment.	Dilemmas	are	peculiar	under	this	view.	If	the	only	difference	between	these	two	types	of	blaming	is	whether	an	all-things-considered	wrong	is	committed,	then	Edward	is	worthy	of	both	under	those	theories	that	hold	his	case	as	genuinely	dilemmatic.	An	obligation	does	not	amount	to	much	if	its	violation	does	not	invite	a	judgment	of	morally	wrong	action.	Thus,	when	Edward	violates	an	obligation	by	choosing	which	of	his	fellow	victims	to	kill	or	let	die,	he	renders	himself	blameworthy	in	both	senses	I	have	outlined.	He	is	clearly	less	worthy	of	indictment	
	 80	
than	one	who	willfully	does	wrong,	however.	What	force	is	at	play	that	mitigates	one’s	blaming	Edward?			The	missing	piece	here	is	sympathy.	It	is	specifically	because	of	the	tragic	nature	of	Edward’s	situation	that	one	is	disinclined	to	blame	him	fully	for	his	actions.	When	one	considers	Edward’s	situation,	one	recognizes	the	difficulty	of	his	choice	and	the	fact	that	he	cannot	but	do	wrong.	We	do	not	suppose	that	a	perfect	moral	agent	would	do	otherwise	than	Edward	does,	since	neither	action	is	preferable	to	the	other.	Thus,	one	can	blame	Edward	for	his	choice,	whichever	that	is,	without	indicting	his	character	or	calling	for	redress	on	behalf	of	the	wronged	party.	One	still	judges	that	Edward	acted	wrongly,	and	whatever	his	particular	action,	one	maintains	that	he	would	avoid	certain	specific	negative	effects	had	he	acted	otherwise.	Nonetheless,	one	cannot	hold	an	attitude	of	righteous	judgment	against	Edward	because	he	had	no	choice	but	to	render	himself	blameworthy	in	some	respect.		 I	will	turn	now	to	the	other	party	involved:	The	kidnapper.	He	carries	the	weight	of	the	most	serious	moral	violation	in	this	example,	but	my	focus	has	been	on	Edward.	As	it	should	be:	This	is	a	project	concerned	with	moral	dilemmas,	not	kidnappings.	The	kidnapper	is	important	to	the	moral	narrative	in	my	example,	however,	because	he	brings	it	about	that	Edward	becomes	a	dilemmatic	chooser.	Obviously,	the	kidnapper	is	wrong	for	kidnapping	his	victims	and	for	subjecting	them	to	such	severe	psychological	trauma.	What	interests	me	in	this	case	is	his	responsibility	for	Edward’s	actions.	Is	the	kidnapper	only	to	blame	for	his	crimes	as	a	kidnapper	and	torturer?	Or	does	he	share	guilt	for	Edward’s	choice	in	the	
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dilemma?	Often,	when	we	imagine	a	moral	dilemma,	it	is	a	situation	where	an	agent	faces	a	tragic	choice	because	of	some	unfortunate	circumstance,	or	else	because	she	got	herself	into	the	predicament.	I	believe	that	shifting	the	responsibility	to	a	third	party	more	clearly	illuminates	how	moral	culpability	operates	in	these	situations,	and	inform	our	approach	to	other	types	of	dilemmas.		 We	have	a	strong	intuition	that	the	kidnapper	is	really	behind	Edward’s	wrongdoing.	There	are	two	possible	ways	to	approach	assigning	culpability	here.	First,	one	could	say	that	Edward’s	wrongful	actions	are	really	the	results	of	the	kidnapper’s	actions.	Whichever	wrong	Edward	commits,	it	may	as	well	be	the	kidnapper’s	hand	pulling	the	trigger	or	the	kidnapper’s	words	condemning	the	nephew	to	die	(in	the	latter	case,	the	kidnapper	is	also	literally	responsible	for	delivering	the	lethal	shock.	I	am	considering	whether	he	is	also	culpable	for	Edward’s	failure	to	prevent	the	death).	On	the	other	hand,	it	could	be	that	the	kidnapper	is	culpable	for	a	separate	evil.	It	will	be	simple	in	most	moral	systems	to	defend	an	obligation	not	to	force	others	to	violate	moral	duties.	In	that	case,	the	kidnapper	is	not	responsible	for	Edward’s	actions,	but	he	is	responsible	for	the	wrongful	act	of	forcing	Edward	to	take	some	immoral	action.		 The	first	formulation	of	the	kidnapper’s	culpability	quickly	runs	into	problems.	The	reader	will	recall	the	previous	chapter	where	I	argued	that	mere	causal	results	of	actions	do	not	necessarily	inherit	obligatory	status	from	the	incipient	act.	In	this	case,	the	kidnapper’s	actions	causally	entail	Edward’s	choosing	one	or	the	other	horn	of	his	dilemma.	The	immorality	of	Edward’s	options	need	not	run	backward	through	time,	however.	The	kidnapper’s	actions	are	not	instrumental	
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acts	for	Edward,	so	they	do	not	inherit	moral	status	in	the	same	way	pulling	the	gun’s	trigger	is	forbidden	because	shooting	the	stranger	is.	It	is	also	important	to	note	that	the	kidnapper	does	not	command	Edward	to	take	either	course.	In	that	case,	assuming	Edward	took	the	prescribed	action,	the	kidnapper	would	be	responsible	in	the	same	way	a	general	is	responsible	when	his	troops	carry	out	his	orders.	Instead,	what	the	kidnapper	does	is	ensure	that	Edward	will	commit	some	wrong	act	by	forcing	him	into	a	dilemmatic	choice.	Whichever	act	Edward	chooses,	that	particular	act	is	his	choice,	and	not	the	kidnapper’s.	However	one	looks	at	it,	the	kidnapper’s	actions	do	not	guarantee	a	particular	outcome,	so	he	is	not	strictly	causally	responsible	for	whichever	harm	is	done.		 The	kidnapper’s	wrongdoing	is	of	the	second	sort.	He	is	responsible	for	forcing	another	person	to	make	some	immoral	choice.	If	actions	are	wrong	because	they	violate	the	wills	of	their	victims,	then	this	is	a	particularly	perverse	thing	to	do.	What	the	kidnapper	has	done	is	not	caused	one	or	the	other	person	to	die,	but	rather	forced	a	man	to	compromise	his	moral	character	by	himself	committing	a	moral	violation.	Here	the	question	of	culpability	is	straightforward:	The	kidnapper’s	action	need	not	inherit	its	blameworthiness	from	Edward’s	choice;	rather,	the	act	itself	is	a	violation.	Edward	has	a	right	to	moral	indignation	toward	the	kidnapper	for	forcing	him	to	do	wrong,	and	the	impartial	judge	has	reason	to	chastise	the	kidnapper,	since	he	committed	a	severely	wrong	act	in	the	face	of	numerous	morally	acceptable	alternatives.	Edward’s	choice	is	tragic	because	he	cannot	but	do	wrong.	The	kidnapper	has	no	such	defense.	He	willfully	violated	a	number	of	moral	
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strictures,	not	the	least	of	which	was	forcing	another	person	to	stain	his	moral	history.		 It	seems	quite	straightforward	to	say	that	the	kidnapper	is	culpable	for	his	wrongdoing,	including	the	particular	action	of	forcing	Edward	to	make	an	impossible	moral	choice.	Consider	now	a	related	example.	Suppose	Edward	knows	the	kidnapper’s	game,	and	rather	than	being	accosted,	he	requests	to	participate.	Perhaps	he	wishes	to	learn	how	a	psychopath’s	mind	works,	or	perhaps	he	simply	wants	to	know	whether	he	has	it	in	him	to	murder	a	stranger	in	order	to	save	a	loved	one.	Suppose	also	that	the	kidnapper	had	already	kidnapped	the	other	two	people	involved,	so	Edward	is	not	implicated	in	their	capture.	Rather,	upon	learning	that	his	nephew	will	be	involved	in	one	of	these	games,	Edward	decides	to	test	himself.	In	that	case,	Edward	is	largely	responsible	for	forcing	himself	into	an	immoral	choice.	Of	course	the	kidnapper	has	committed	a	number	of	morally	abhorrent	acts,	but	the	particular	crime	of	forcing	Edward	to	choose	either	of	two	unacceptable	alternatives	falls	on	Edward’s	own	shoulders.	When	the	kidnapper	forced	him	to	choose,	the	kidnapper	invited	the	blame	for	causing	another	person	to	compromise	his	own	moral	character	by	choosing	to	do	wrong.	Now,	it	is	Edward	who	is	forcing	himself	to	compromise	his	moral	fiber.	Is	Edward	blameworthy	for	this	self-violation?	Certainly	we	wish	to	blame	Edward	more	severely	than	in	the	case	where	he	is	kidnapped,	but	is	it	correct	to	say	that	he	has	wronged	himself?	To	say	so	would	dismiss	the	strong	intuition	that	he	has	done	a	greater	wrong	by	those	whom	he	inevitably	harms	because	of	his	
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actions.	We	are	not	concerned	with	Edward	as	a	victim	in	this	case,	but	rather	with	the	perversity	of	choosing	to	later	choose	to	harm	some	other	person.	In	this	case,	we	might	actually	say	that	the	initial	choice	is	instrumental	to	the	dilemmatic	violation.	This	view	does	not	quite	capture	what	is	going	on,	however.	We	need	not	suppose	Edward	intends	either	choice	he	eventually	makes	from	the	outset.	He	might	not	even	be	able	to	reasonably	predict	what	he	will	do	when	the	time	comes.	Rather,	he	is	culpable	because	he	makes	a	choice	ensuring	he	will	later	do	wrong.	We	might	now	invoke	the	logical-necessity	interpretation	of	the	principle	of	deontic	entailment.	If	we	let	“A”	stand	for	“Edward	chooses	to	enter	a	dilemmatic	situation”	and	“B”	for	“Edward	commits	some	all-things-considered	wrong	action,”	it	is	quite	clear	that	A	logically	entails	B.	Eventually	doing	some	all-things-considered	wrong	is	central	to	the	definition	of	entering	into	a	dilemma.	Thus	the	antecedent	of	(PDE)’s	main	conditional	holds:	£(A	⊃	B).	For	this	particular	case,	we	will	need	the	contrapositive:	£(~B	⊃	~A).	Then	the	relevant	instance	of	(PDE)	is	this:	£(~B	⊃	~A)	⊃	(O~B	⊃	O~A).	O~B	holds	by	definition,	since	B	is	specified	to	be	all-things-considered	morally	wrong.	Thus,	O~A	follows.	Here	we	see	that	A	is	not	forbidden	because	it	compromises	Edward’s	character.	Edward	himself	is	the	only	person	who	can	perform	the	action	A,	and	by	performing	it	he	would	void	the	very	strength	of	character	that	appears	to	be	in	jeopardy.	Rather,	A	inherits	its	deontic	status	because	forbearing	from	A	is	a	logically	necessary	condition	of	forbearing	from	B.	Edward	is	blameworthy	in	this	case	for	committing	a	moral	violation	he	had	every	opportunity	to	avoid.	His	choice	in	the	dilemma	is	no	different	from	the	choice	he	
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made	when	forced	into	the	situation.	When	he	elects	to	enter	the	dilemma,	however,	he	violates	a	distinct	but	related	obligation	not	to	do	what	entails	a	further	violation.	In	analyzing	Edward’s	situation,	I	have	paid	special	attention	to	blame.	The	difficulty	of	assigning	blame	to	dilemmatic	agents	is,	I	believe,	one	of	the	greatest	conceptual	strikes	against	dilemma-producing	theories.	We	naturally	associate	blame	and	wrongdoing,	and	the	former	seems	to	require	that	the	blamed	party	have	some	option	to	act	to	avoid	blameworthiness.	In	clarifying	this	matter,	I	have	served	a	double	purpose.	Those	who	are	attracted	to	dilemma-producing	theories	may	have	a	clearer	idea	of	how	to	approach	the	subject	in	application,	and	those	who	rely	on	blame	as	an	argument	against	dilemmas’	admission	into	ethics	may	find	themselves	in	need	of	a	new	tack.	Over	the	course	of	this	project,	I	have	explored	what	I	take	to	be	the	most	compelling	arguments	against	dilemmas	on	the	grounds	of	consistency.	The	intuition	that	dilemmas	cannot	be	allowed	in	a	consistent	system	of	action-guiding	principles	has	some	weight.	It	is	supported	by	several	candidate	axioms	of	deontic	logic,	which	together	would	indeed	show	dilemmas	to	be	inconsistent.	What	I	have	shown	is	that	these	axioms	are	not	in	fact	fundamental	to	the	project	of	formalizing	ethical	claims,	and	so	should	only	be	admitted	on	independent	theoretical	grounds,	rather	than	taken	as	axioms	of	every	admissible	deontic	logic.	When	these	principles	are	shown	to	be	fallible,	the	formal	arguments	against	dilemmas	fail.	I	have	now	also	demonstrated	that	blame	can	be	understood	and	used	meaningfully	within	theories	that	admit	dilemmas.	Without	defending	any	particular	normative	position,	I	will	end	on	this:	It	may	be	fruitful	to	further	exploration	in	ethical	theory	if	theorists	
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consider	the	value	of	accepting	dilemmas	and	weaken	the	restrictions	so	often	put	in	place	to	ensure	that	obligations	be	never	in	conflict.	
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